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Mental State Attribution for Interactionism
Uku Tooming
Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
Interactionists about folk psychology argue that embodied interactions constitute
the primary way we understand one another and thus oppose more standard ac-
counts according to which the understanding is mostly achieved through belief
and desire attributions. However, also interactionists need to explain why people
sometimes still resort to attitude ascription. In this paper, it is argued that this ex-
planatory demand presents a genuine challenge for interactionism and that a pop-
ular proposal which claims that belief and desire attributions are needed to make
sense of counternormative behavior is problematic. Instead, the most promising
conception of belief and desire ascriptions is the communicative conception which
locates them in the context of declarative and imperative communication, respec-
tively. Such a communication can take both verbal and non-verbal form.
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1. Introduction
Humans are characterized, among other things, by having a particularly
complex social life, not only in terms of the quantity of individuals and their
interdependence, but also in terms of various abilities which they can rely on
in order to cooperate, to compete, and to understand one another. Among
these we have the capacity to attribute propositional attitudes, such as beliefs
and desires.e development of the capacity to attribute beliefs, which are
usually seen as paradigmatic representational mental states, has been espe-
cially prominent area of research in developmental psychology and philos-
ophy of mind. Acquiring this ability is oen seen as a moment of passing a
particularly important developmental hurdle.
Not all agree that propositional attitude attribution is the central ele-
ment in folk psychology. It has been argued that it is possible to understand
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others perfectly well by responding to bodily expressions and by relying on
social routines, thus circumventing the need to ascribe beliefs and desires
to one another. I use the label ‘Interactioneory’ (IT) to denote a plethora
of views which claim that propositional attitude attributions are not usually
needed in everyday interactions where people anticipate, coordinate with,
manipulate, and understand each others’ actions. An obvious question to
ask is how then the idea of propositional attitudes appeared in the human
conceptual repertoire in the rst place. If the success in everyday social cog-
nition does not require the ability to ascribe beliefs and desires, what could
motivate people to speculate about the complex, contentful inner states that
cannot be directly perceived in bodily expressions? ere are several an-
swers available.
In this paper, I investigate this question and answers that have been given
to it. I will not defend the truth of IT. Instead, I am interested in the con-
ditional question: if IT is true, can it account for the role of propositional
attitude attributions? I will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I outline the
basic ideas of IT and argue that it is reasonable to bring quite dierent au-
thors under the same label. Having done that, I go on to analyze dierent
proposals about the role of propositional attitude attributions. In Section 3, I
turn to a proposal, endorsed by the main IT theorists and by others, accord-
ing to which the attribution of propositional attitudes becomes necessary in
cases of explaining counternormative or unexpected behavior. I point out
certain problems with such an approach, look for a dierent one in Section
4 and nd it from Christopher Gauker’s communicative conception which
associates belief- and desire-attributions (BD attributions, in short) with the
ability to comprehend speech acts. In the end, in Section 5, I argue that if
we extend the basic idea of the communicative conception in a certain way,
we can understand why the idea of propositional attitudes could be needed,
although humans can mostly get by without it (as IT claims).
2. Interactionist accounts of social cognition
e ability to attributemental states has been one of themain research topics
in the interdisciplinary eld of social cognition. For a long time, the main
theories in that area have beeneoryeory (TT), Simulationeory (ST)
and recently their hybrids. According to TT (Gopnik and Meltzo 1997;
Baron-Cohen 1995), we rely on theoretical information concerning the rela-
tions between mental states and behavior when we explain and predict each
others’ actions. ST, on the other hand, conceives of the process in terms of
the attributer imagining herself in the situation of the attributee and project-
ing the imagined beliefs and desires to her (Goldman 1989; Gordon 1995).
Hybrid theories combine elements of the two (Goldman 2006; Stich and
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Nichols 2003). What unies all three types of theory is the centrality given
tomental state attribution (ormentalizing) in social cognition.e paradig-
matic mental states have usually been propositional attitudes, such as beliefs
and desires. From this point on, I gather these accounts under the label
‘Standardeory-of-Mind,’ or simply ‘ToM.’e utility of BD attributions
is quite apparent in that kind of approach—they provide a primary way to
explain and predict behavior.
For some time now, the aforementioned theories have had their dis-
senters. Shaun Gallagher (2001; 2006) has criticized ToM for not doing jus-
tice to our experience of people. In a smooth interaction we do not need
to speculate about others’ unobservable mental states. Instead, responding
to the observable bodily expressions and jointly attending to wordly entities
suces to make others intelligible. According to Gallagher, we can directly
perceive others’mental states in their expressive behavior (Gallagher 2008a).
A number of authors have raised similar criticisms against ToM (De Jaegher
and di Paolo 2007; Ratclie 2007; Hutto 2004; Leudar et al. 2004).e eec-
tiveness of embodied interactions is also appealed to in order to account for
the developmental data, according to which the primary way for infants to
make sense of others is constituted by responses to bodily expressions (see
Reddy 2008), and this remains operative also in later years (Gallagher 2012,
191).
One might ask whether the critics of ToM are not pursuing a strawman.
Also standard ToM theorists are interested in how low-level mindreading
works and admit its importance (see Goldman 2006, Ch. 6). What is more,
proponents of ToM accept that the ability to attribute mental states builds
developmentally upon more embodied ways of responding to one other.
For instance, Baron-Cohen (1995) sees the ability to detect intentions and
to follow gaze as important precursors of ToM. One must admit, however,
that Baron-Cohen construes intention- and gaze-detection mentalistically,
in the form of mental state attribution, so that the infant is supposed to pro-
duce representations in the form “x wants this-or-that” and “x sees this-or-
that” (Baron-Cohen 1995, 33). Critics of ToM, on the other hand, construe
those abilities which are expressed in embodied interactions as not involv-
ing mentalizing. For instance, some enactivists take interaction processes
themselves already to constitute social cognition (McGann and de Jaegher
2009; Torrance and Froese 2011), so that guessing the inner causes of oth-
ers’ actions is unnecessary. ere are also those who claim that, instead of
attributing mental states in everyday interactions, people rely on a skillful
know-how which involves a capacity to respond in exible ways to salient
features in the enviroment, in this case the features of the bodily expressions
of others. For instance, Hutto understands this kind of responding in terms
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of what he calls “Action Coordination Routines”, which do not involve con-
tentful thinking (Hutto 2008, 50).ere does seem to exist a genuine antag-
onism, then, concerning the question of the role of mental state attributions
in human social cognition, and the strawman-objection misses its mark. As
Gallagher puts it:
IT rejects the supposition of universality in regard to mentalizing, ei-
ther by theory or by simulation. Rather, mentalizing or mindreading
are, at best, specialized abilities that are relatively rarely employed,
and they depend on more embodied and situated ways of perceiving
and understanding others, which are more primary and pervasive.
(Gallagher 2008b, 165)
But what kind of mental states are we talking about when we are talking
about mentalizing? When the proponents of IT reject the centrality of at-
tributing or inferring mental states, they do not reject such states that can
presumably be observed in the behavior of others without inference, such
as emotions or intentions-in-action. What do not seem to be observable are
propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires, which have amuchmore
tenuous connection to overt behavior. Because of this, the claim that we do
not need to attribute or infer mental states should be limited to the attri-
bution or inference of propositional attitudes. My suggestion, then, is that
we construe the dierence between ToM and IT in terms of their stance on
the ability to attribute propositional attitudes: while ToM theorists see it as a
pervasively used capacity in social cognition, the proponents of IT deny this
and consider it largely unnecessary and dependent on interactive abilities
which evolve earlier.
To characterize propositional attitudes, I largely rely onZawidzki’s (2013,
11) account. According to Zawidzki, for a mental state to be a propositional
attitude it needs to have semantic properties, thus representing some state
of aairs, either actual or possible, under some mode of presentation, and
its relation to behavior has to be mediated by a holistic web of other propo-
sitional attitudes.e latter aspect is what makes its connection with behav-
ior tenuous—one type of behavior is in accordance with numerous sets of
propositional attitudes, which means that the actual set should be inferred
somehow, although it cannot be observed. e rst feature—propositional
attitudes having semantic properties—is basically a conceptual truism. Most
importantly, I distinguish between beliefs and desires as forming two main
subtypes of propositional attitude, the rst representing a state of aairs as
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obtaining, and the second as something to be made to obtain (or something
that should obtain).1
Given that beliefs and desires present their content in particular ways,
there are also specic responses to them, which help us distinguish between
the two types of attitude. Beliefs and desires can be understood in terms of
what kind of actions they aord to the attributers of these attitudes. In the
case of belief, themost immediate reaction is either to agree or disagree with
it. More precisely, when a person attributes a belief that p to someone, she
can either agree that p is true or disagree. Because to believe that p is is to
take p to be true, themost immediate response for an attributer is to evaluate
the truth of p oneself. In the case of desire, the respective response is to ap-
prove or disapprove it. Since wanting that p involves treating p as something
to be pursued or something that should be the case, one can take a stand
whether to approve the realization of p or not. Agreement/disagreement and
approval/disapproval are the basic content-directed responses to attributed
beliefs and desires, respectively. By claiming this, I do not mean that people
always respond to attitudes in such ways or that these are the only responses,
but these responses reliably indicate that either belief or desire attribution
has taken place.
Having distinguished IT and brought out the main characteristics of BD
attribution, one can now ask: how should IT account for the attribution of
propositional attitudes? It seems, aer all, to be unnecessary for everyday
social cognition.e challenge is to explain why one would need the idea of
propositional attitudes if one seemingly can get by without it.
It is not entirely clear how to understand this question. One possibility
is to apply it to ontogeny, in which case it would be a question about the
developmental prole of children: when and why does a child start to apply
propositional attitude concepts? Under this interpretation, answering the
why-question seems to be easy: she starts to apply those concepts because
she has the necessary cognitive mechanisms up and running. One should
simply investigate what those mechanisms are and the problem would be
solved. My interest here is dierent, though. e question is, rather: why
would anyone need the propositional attitude concepts in the rst place?
A more promising place to look, then, seems to be the phylogenetic level
at which one can ask how our ancestors evolved to the point where apply-
ing the concepts of belief and desire payed o to be retained in the con-
ceptual repertoire. at being said, I will rely here on the method of ratio-
nal reconstruction—the aim is to clarify what benets the concepts of be-
1 is distinction shouldmap onto the dierence in terms of the direction of t. A gist of this
notion was introduced by Anscombe (1959, Sections 2 and 42). For an explicit application
of this idea to beliefs and desires, see (Platts 1979).
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lief and desire confer to their possessors which could explain their adoption
and maintenance. Such a reconstruction should still cohere with evolution-
ary and developmental facts and be open to falsication in the light of those
facts.
Since I am dealing with a conditional question and assuming that IT
is right, I will not go into weighing arguments for and against IT.at be-
ing said, I still have to mention and deate one immediate challenge that
arises. For quite some time now, many developmental psychologists and
philosophers have argued that infants are able to attribute beliefs earlier than
it was usually thought. In their extremely inuential paper, Onishi and Bail-
largeon (2005) used a looking-time measure to show that 15-month-old in-
fants looked longer when an agent searched for an object from a location
which was inconsistent with her belief about the location of the object, thus
indicating that infants are aware of others having false beliefs. Following
studies, oen using dierent methods, indicated that infants may have the
ability to attribute beliefs even earlier, going as far as to claim that already
7-month-old infants are able to do it (Kovács et al. 2010).2
If the mentalistic interpretation of these studies were correct, it would
pose serious problems for IT. If already prelinguistic infants were attributing
beliefs (and presumably also desires) to predict and explain behavior, then
the idea that attitude attribution is not at the center of our intersubjective
engagements would be in jeopardy. IT assumes that our primary way to
understand and anticipate each others’ actions is non-mentalistic, but the
mentalistic interpretation of implicit false belief tasks suggests otherwise.
A promising response to the mentalistic interpretation of infants’ abili-
ties, however, is proposed by Cecilia Heyes who argues that instead of en-
dowing infants with the concept of belief we can explain their behavior in
implicit false belief tasks in terms of domain-general processes (Heyes 2014).
More specically, she claims that infants’ reactions (i.e., longer looking times,
anticipatory looking) to agents not acting in accordance with their beliefs
are due to low-level novelty of how observable stimuli appear (how colors,
shapes and movements are arranged). According to Heyes, we can interpret
all the experimental results in terms of low-level perceptual novelty. Natu-
rally, the jury is still out whether all the non-mentalistic re-interpretations
by Heyes are fully successful but in the present context it suces to point
out that the results of implicit false belief tasks have not yet demonstrated
the need to think that BD ascriptions are pervasive in human cognition. I
will be assuming, then, that IT is a feasible position.3
2 For a general overview of the studies on implicit false belief tasks, see (Carruthers 2013).
3 See also Gallagher’s own suggestion of how to interpret implicit false belief tasks non-
mentalistically (Gallagher 2012, 197). BothGallagher’s andHeyes’s accounts coherewith IT,
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Before moving on, I need to fend o a possible misunderstanding. From
the literature on IT one might get the impression that IT is committed to
a view that the ability to attribute attitudes is constitutively dependent on
language-use. For instance, Hutto is convinced that our ability to under-
stand propositional attitudes (and propositional content more generally) is
based on our capacity to comprehend and produce linguistic utterances with
sentential content (Hutto 2008, Ch. 5). Hutto’s conception of folk psychol-
ogy as a narrative practice seems to presuppose linguistic determinism and
it is supported by another proponent of IT, Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher and
Hutto 2008).e defense of this idea coheres well with the non-mentalistic
understanding of implicit false belief tasks: if the capacity for BDattributions
develops relatively late and builds upon more primary ways of responding,
one natural way to conceive of its development is to connect it with language
which is also acquired later than the more basic socio-cognitive skills.
However, it is important to keep in mind that IT, as I have dened it,
is not committed to linguistic determinism with respect to BD attributions.
It is one thing to claim that BD attributions constitute a peripheral part of
social cognition and it is another thing to say that the capacity to attribute
beliefs and desires is constitutively dependent on linguistic capacities. We
need not assume the latter.is is a good thing because there is evidence that
people with severely impaired grammar still have their mentalizing ability
intact (Varley and Siegal 2000; Apperly et al. 2006), suggesting that the lin-
guistic determination thesis is false.is will become important later in this
essay.
I can now address a quite popular explanation of why BD attributions
become needed: the Justicatory Role Account.
3. Propositional attitudes as explanatory devices
BD attributions help us rationalize behavior (Davidson 1963). To under-
stand why someone acted the way she did, we consider what she wanted
to achieve and what she believed was necessary to do in order to satisfy her
desires. If some action is puzzling to us, a rationalizing belief-desire expla-
nation can reduce the puzzlement. In recent years, some authors have ar-
gued that the need to attribute beliefs and desires arises when one needs
to make sense of seemingly irrational or counternormative actions. For in-
stance, Kristin Andrews has argued that an explanation of behavior in terms
of attitudes is called for in situations which are anomalous or inappropriate.
but I nd the latter more clear. Actually, Gallagher’s interpretation may not be so dierent
fromHeyes’s because he also appeals to the idea that infants’ behavior in implicit false belief
tasks can be explained in terms of their perceptual expectations (Gallagher 2012, 199).
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Ordinary behavior, on the other hand, can already be explained by appeal-
ing to norms (Andrews 2009). is also means that an understanding of
norms is developmentally prior to theory ofmind. In support of the priority-
claim, Andrews cites evidence from primate studies according to which pri-
mates who lack ToM (at least in the sense of the ability to attribute proposi-
tional attitudes) have an implicit understanding of norms (Perry et al. 2003;
Boesch 2002). She claims that there is a clear benet that the introduction of
reason-explanations confers to a communitywhere people encounter norm-
violations. Instead of merely punishing the violator, one can ask for the rea-
son why she acted in this way and try to justify it; justication can then help
to rene norms and develop new ones (Andrews 2009, 445).
Another author who has proposed a similar idea is Tad Zawidzki. To
understand his proposal, one should take into account his general approach
to understanding human cognition. According to Zawidzki, our species-
specic cognitive endowments are largely a result of mindshaping mecha-
nisms which have molded our minds and behaviors to be (relatively) pre-
dictable and homogenous. ese mechanisms underlie such processes as
imitation, natural pedagogy, submission to norms and language-based reg-
ulative frameworks (Zawidzki 2013, 29). Becausemindshaping regulates hu-
man behavior, there is usually no need to attribute beliefs and desires in or-
der to knowwhat a person will do or to understand why she acted in the way
she did.e question arises, then, what are the conditions, given the overall
homogeneity of human behavior and thought, for attributing propositional
attitudes.
Zawidzki grounds the capacity to attribute propositional attitudes in the
practice of undertaking and attributing discursive commitments. e idea
of conceptualizing linguistic practice in such a way goes back to Brandom
(2000). Zawidzki takes over the basic idea and argues that the ability to
undertake and attribute such commitments is a result of language-based
regulation of behavior (a form of mindshaping), most notably expressed in
the practices of promising and asserting (Zawidzki 2013, 216). If a person
promises or asserts something, she commits herself to future courses of ac-
tion. For instance, in case of assertion, the asserter commits herself to justify
her assertion when challenged. Violations of such commitments provoke
sanctions and bring about a loss of social prestige and status. Zawidzki ar-
gues that the need for BD attributions arises in situations wherein a person
persists in violating her discursive commitments, which then calls for the
question: what does she really think (Zawidzki 2013, 218)? e answer to
this question, if acceptable, may rehabilitate her social status and explain her
counternormative behavior. For Zawidzki, then, the primary role of attitude
ascriptions is justicatory.
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Such an approach to BD attributions is also endorsed by the main
proponents of IT like Dan Hutto and Shaun Gallagher. Hutto’s Narrative
Practice Hypothesis (NPH) assumes that belief and desire attributions earn
their keep in explaining norm-violating behaviors (Hutto 2008, 7; Gallagher
agrees with this, see Gallagher and Hutto 2008). Framing such behaviors
in terms of a narrative which makes reference to agents’ beliefs and desires
helps us understand why they acted that way. Hutto admits that sometimes
when a behavior is especially strange, a reference to beliefs and desires is
insucient, and then a more informative narrative is needed. Nevertheless,
the attribution of beliefs and desires still functions in the context of making
sense of behaviors which violate some norm. It thus has a relatively limited
but still important role to play in social cognition.
Although Andrews, Zawidzki and Hutto approach the issue of propo-
sitional attitude attributions from dierent angles, the content of their pro-
posals is very similar. All of them take the justication of norm-violating
behavior to be the main role of BD attributions. Let’s call this view ‘Justica-
tory Role Account’ (JRA). In what follows, I raise some concerns about JRA.
It is important to note that Andrews and Zawidzki do not take themselves
to be interactionists. However, their explanations of BD attribution can be
nicely located within the IT framework.
So what are the diculties that JRA faces? e rst, least serious prob-
lem is that attitude ascriptions are also perfectly appropriate when we ex-
plain behaviors which do not violate any norms. If someone goes to a store
and buys milk, we can explain her action by citing her desire to drink milk
and her belief that the store sells it.is is a perfectly understandable context
wherein no norm is violated.e fact that BD explanations are rationalizing
explanations thus does not mean that they are always meant to justify norm
violations. One can object, however, that this should not be really damaging
to JRA because the idea is rather that people aremotivated to ascribe beliefs
and desires to rehabilitate normative status. Behaviors which do not violate
norms are supposedly also understandable without ascribing these attitudes.
e problem with this response is that the present question is not when
people aremotivated to attribute beliefs and desires, given that the respective
contexts are already in use, but the question is: what could be themotivation
for introducing the concepts of belief and desire in the rst place? e fact
that people have a tendency to ascribe attitudes when the normative status of
the attributee is in jeopardy does not entail that that is the primary rationale
for doing this. However, even if we accept that JRA is correct in claiming
that counternormative contexts are signicantly dierent from those that
are not, JRA faces a more serious problem.is concerns the fact that there
are other ways of oering normalizing explanations than by appealing to
Uku Tooming 193
BD attributions and which are presumably more simple, circumventing the
need to ascribe attitudes. For instance, the explanatory role of norms could
also be extended to behaviors which do not accord with a particular norm.
is idea might sound paradoxical but it is not. Consider the possibility that
dierent norms can apply to the same action-type. Although an action may
violate one norm, it can still accord with a dierent one. An appeal to that
second norm can then indicate why the action was reasonable without one
having to make any reference to beliefs and desires of the agent. Take, for
instance, Andrews’s example of a colleague yelling obscenities to a girl on
the street (Andrews 2009, 437).is is a situation which violates a norm of
politeness wherein one obvious way to make sense of the colleague’s behav-
ior is to ask what he believes about the girl. An explanation in terms of an
alternative norm, however, can work just as well. One only needs to intro-
duce a norm which species conditions under which it would be allowed to
yell obscenities to another person and to explain the action by stating that
these conditions are met. Note that this does not require buying into such
a norm oneself, nor does it imply that the norm which is used in the expla-
nation is a good one. What is important is that by specifying the new norm
one does not have to speculate about the contentful mental states of the rude
person; there is no need for BD attributions. e alternative explanation is
simpler because the understanding of norms is something that already exists
in the community, while the concepts of belief and desire have not yet been
introduced.
One can object that there are situations wherein such a normalization
of behavior does not seem to work. is becomes apparent when we con-
sider violations of discursive commitments in which case there is less room
for thinking about alternative norms that would justify behavior. Yelling
obscenities is presumably not an example of full-edged discursive action.
Let’s take Zawidzki’s example of a hunter who reports the location of prey to
be in the north, and when it turns out that there is no prey to the north he
can justify his assertion by appealing to his belief that there was prey to the
north (Zawidzki 2013, 220). Because the minimal norm for (sincere) asser-
tion is that it should be true (Turri 2013), a justication of the assertion by
an alternative norm is suspect. Possible alternative norms, like knowledge
or belief, make reference to propositional attitudes and are thus of no use in
the present context.
One should note, however, that this adds a serious qualication to JRA
by limiting the cases when BD attributions are needed. What is even more
problematic is that this concession seems to commit one to accept linguistic
determinism about BD attributions which I rejected in the previous section.
In addition, I am not sure whether the appeal to the peculiarity of discursive
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commitments is successful. It still excludes alternative ways to justify norm-
violating behaviors. For instance, the hunter could also justify his mistaken
assertion by claiming that his evidence was indicating that prey was to the
north. Evidence need not make any reference to the hunter’s propositional
attitudes. In response, one could argue, by appealing to mentalism in epis-
temology, that evidence for a proposition consists in having certain mental
states (Conee and Feldman 2001). In such a case, an appeal to subjective
evidence would involve attributing beliefs (or seemings) to oneself. But at
the moment we are considering a community where the concepts of belief
and desire are lacking and it seems strange to claim that people in such a
community cannot have any understanding of evidence. We can think of
such evidence (or quasi-evidence, if you want) in factual terms, so that the
hunter’s appeal to evidence would mean that there are certain signs to the
north that usually indicate the presence of the prey.
ere are additional problems with JRA.ere is a type of action-ex-
planation that has been completely overlooked by the proponents of JRA,
namely, the explanation of actions in terms of other actions. An example
would be an action of breaking eggs in a process of making an omelet.e
action of making an omelet explains why the person is breaking eggs. Ac-
tions are embedded in other actions and explanations can take advantage
of that fact, without necessarily referring to mental states. Michaelomp-
son calls these “naive explanations of action” and argues that they constitute
themost fundamental form that action explanations take (ompson 2008).
For the present purposes, it is important to point out that such explanations
are feasible alternatives to explanations in terms of attitudes. Naive action
explanations can also function as normalizing explanations: by locating a
strange action within the structure of an acceptable one we can make the
rst intelligible in terms of the second. is circumvents the need to at-
tribute attitudes. Again, as in the case of alternative norms, naive action
explanations seem to be simpler than explanations in terms of BD attribu-
tions. If a community lacks the attitude concepts, it is more natural to apply
the already existing knowledge about the teleologial structure of action than
to introduce new concepts.
One could raise the concern that perhaps the reference to attitudes in the
case of action-based explanations is simply unmarked while there is still an
implicit reference (for the markedness-unmarkedness distinction, see Malle
et al. 2007). If this were true, the explanations in terms of actions would not
constitute an alternative to explanations in terms of attitudes.4 I would point
out, however, thatompson’s arguments are meant to show that naive ex-
planations are irreducible to the more sophisticated ones and it is a burden
4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
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on the opponent to prove that they still implicitly involve BD attributions.
More importantly, there are empirical reasons to think that naive action-
explanations are not mentalistic in nature. Already six-and-a-half month
old infants who presumably lack the capacity to mindread are able to un-
derstand goal-directed actions, indicating that the ability to grasp the tele-
ological structure of actions is irreducible to explanations in terms of BD
attributions (Csibra 2008; see also Gergely and Csibra 2003).
As for another objection, it is not completely clear whether a naive ac-
tion explanation can be applied to expressions of discursive commitments
as brought out in Zawidzki’s example. What is the wider action that justi-
es the hunter’s false assertion but which does not make reference to beliefs
and desires? Well, he might say that he asserted that prey was to the north
because he was informing others about the prey’s location, given the evi-
dence he had. Admittedly, in such a case the justicatory burden seems to
be carried by his evidence, not his action. is would bring us back to the
question of whether evidence has to involve reference to beliefs and desires
and I already argued that we should not assume that.5
We can say, then, that the justication of behavior is not solely the
province of BD attributions. It can be accomplished by other, more mini-
malist means which rely on resources which are already available for a com-
munity whose members do not yet possess the concepts of belief and desire:
understanding of norms and of the structure of actions.is does not entail
a denite falsity of JRA, of course. Nonetheless, it reduces motivation for
it. Since we are interested in the question of why the attitude attributions
were introduced in the rst place, it is not clear whether such attributions
are needed if they do not deliver a distinctive benet. JRA thus faces various
challenges. In what follows, I will propose that Christopher Gauker’s com-
municative conception of beliefs and desires is a more promising way for IT
to explain the need for the concepts of belief and desire.
4. e communicative conception and IT
In Section 2, I claimed that BD attributions are indicated by the responses
of agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval. ese are proper re-
sponses not only to beliefs and desires, however. We can also agreewithwhat
others have asserted and we can approve others’ commands. e responses
in question nd their home in the communicative behavior of human beings
and are most apparent in communicative contexts.
5 As I pointed out earlier, limiting BD attributions to discursive contexts also seems to entail
a problematic form of linguistic determinism.
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It could be argued that the appropriateness of these responses to asser-
tions and commands derives from the underlying attitudes, so that when we
agree or disagree with an assertion we are actually agreeing or disagreeing
with the belief that this assertion expresses, and when we approve or disap-
prove a command we are actually approving or disapproving the desire that
is expressed by the command. is is not the only way to see the relation
between attitudes and speech acts, however. Christopher Gauker’s commu-
nicative conception of beliefs and desires (henceforth, CC) provides an al-
ternative. According to Gauker, if we attribute a belief to someone, we are
actually making an assertion on her behalf; and if we attribute a desire, we
are making a command on her behalf (Gauker 2003, 221). CC understands
beliefs and desires in terms of the respective speech acts, not the other way
around. e attribution of attitudes is conceived of as an extension of the
practice of linguistic communication. For example, if X asserts that there is
a new Chinese restaurant in town, Y can convey X’s assertion by saying that
X believes that there is a new Chinese restaurant in town; and if X orders Y
to do the dishes, Y can say that X wants her to do the dishes. e content
of the ascribed attitude does not have to fully match the content of the re-
spective speech act that is being conveyed and it is also possible to assert or
command on X’s behalf (i.e., attribute a belief or a desire) without X having
performed the respective speech act. Mental state attributions thus tran-
scend the actual linguistic behavior of the attributee, but are still identiable
as language-involving acts. It is important to point out that the assertions
and requests can also be performed silently, without uttering them aloud.
It should be easy to see that CC provides an answer to the question of
this essay, namely: why do we need to introduce the concepts of belief and
desire if they generally do not play a central role in our everyday interactions
(i.e., assuming the truth of IT)? According to CC, the concepts of belief and
desire nd their use in extending the practice of linguistic communication:
they enable us to assert and command on others’ behalf. A proponent of IT
can thus accommodate this explanation into her overall theory.e use for
BD attributions will be conned to certain contexts and does not pervade
our typical interactions in which we dispense with the need for BD attribu-
tions and rely on embodied interaction and normative frameworks instead.6
Keep in mind that Gauker himself is not an interactionist, but IT can use his
conception of BD attributions, given that CC and IT share the view about the
extent to which people engage in BD attributions. It seems to t into the gen-
eral framework in which three levels of intersubjectivity are distinguished,
so that BD attributions become necessary only at the third level which in-
6 I should note in advance that I eventually reject CC in its original form.
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volves linguistic skills (Gallagher andHutto 2008).7 AlthoughGallagher and
Hutto associated the capacity to ascribe attitudes most closely with the par-
ticipation in narrative practices, the grasp of imperative and assertive speech
acts is also something that belongs to the third level of intersubjectivity.
But why exactly does one have to introduce new concepts to assert and
command on others’ behalf? Are not the concepts of assertion and com-
mand enough? Gauker suggests that the attribution of an attitude, instead
of restating the respective speech act, is useful when the authority or relia-
bility of the person who uttered the speech act is in doubt (Van Cleave and
Gauker 2010, 310).e attitude concepts are used when the vicarious speech
acts are qualied in important respects.is dierence between speech acts
and attitudes seems to be relatively supercial, however. To understand a
more important dierence, it is important to repeat that BD attributions do
not have to track the actual assertions and commands of attributees: some-
times it is appropriate to assert or command on a person’s behalf even when
he or she has not performed the respective speech act. Nevertheless, by at-
tributing the respective attitude we can treat her as if she had asserted or
commanded. For instance, if a person’s behavior indicates that it is rational
for her to assert that p, we can treat her as if she had asserted it by attributing
to her the belief (i.e., by asserting on her behalf) that p, so that it would be
possible to express one’s disagreement with her. A good example of such a
context is the case of attributing an implicit belief that p: although the per-
son is not disposed to assert that p, her behavior is in accordance with such
an assertion.8 For instance, if one asserts that all races are equal but tends
to act in discriminatory ways toward people of other color, we can assert
on her behalf (i.e., attribute a belief to her) that all races are not equal (see
Schwitzgebel 2010, 532). In the case of desire attributions, on the other hand,
the facts about what a person is disposed to like and take pleasure in con-
stitute the best indicator of what it is appropriate to command on her behalf
(see Tooming 2014). For example, if one knows that another person is hun-
gry and would enjoy eating some cake, one can request a piece of cake on
her behalf (given that one has other-regarding motivation) and attribute a
desire for a piece of cake by doing it.
One can be motivated to make such vicarious utterances while not in-
tending to respect the dispositional facts about another person. e con-
7 e rst level involves embodied practices like imitation, perception of intentions and re-
sponses to expressions of emotion (Gallagher and Hutto 2008, 20) and the second consists
in understanding others’ actions in pragmatic contexts (Gallagher and Hutto 2008, 23).
8 e behavior which is in accordance with the assertion that p should be speciable without
any reference to propositional attitudes, otherwise the explanation of the concept of belief
would be circular. For a proposal how to do this, see (Stout 2006, 123).
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cerns about appropriateness come into play when the attributer has the epis-
temic interest in accurately capturing the dispositions of the attributee.ere
are many cases, however, when the assertion or request on another person’s
behalf is meant to damage or improve her social status. For instance, if we
treat someone as if she had asserted something ridiculous (i.e., take them
to believe something ridiculous), we can bring into question her trustwor-
thiness.e practice of speaking for others is loaded with political motives
and oen functions to perpetuate unequal relations between people (Alco
1991).9 Instead of understanding the motivation to introduce attitude con-
cept in narrowly epistemic terms we should treat the usefulness of BD attri-
butions in a broader sense, involving both epistemic and pragmatic motiva-
tion to treat others as if they had asserted or requested something. We can
then articulate more broadly what the introduction of the concepts of belief
and desire adds to the socio-cognitive practice: the concept of belief is used
to assert on X’s behalf when X has not made the respective assertion, but it is
useful—where usefulness is understood in the broad sense—to treat her as
if she did; and the concept of desire is used to command on X’s behalf when
X herself has not made the respective command, but it is useful to treat her
as if she did.e important point is that there is plenty of motivation to in-
troduce BD attributions as assertions and requests on others’ behalf to the
communicative practice.
e communicative conception is in a good position to make explicit
why the responses of agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval are
characteristic reactions to attributed beliefs and desires, respectively: they
derive from our practice of making assertions and commands. More im-
portantly, while JRA faced the diculty with excluding alternative, more
simple ways of normalizing behavior (alternative norms and other actions),
CC demonstrates a need for BD attributions which presumably cannot be
satised by other means. It is dicult to nd any other way in which one
could treat another as if the latter had asserted or commanded something
than by attributing beliefs and desires to her, and my bet is that there really
is not any other way. Finally, CC is also able to explain how BD attribu-
tions can be employed to explain behavior, be it counternormative or not.
CC achieves this by reconstructing BD explanations as attributions of inner
conversations. If we are rationalizing someone’s behavior in terms of beliefs
and desires, we are requesting on her behalf that she achieve a certain goal
and we are asserting on her behalf how to achieve it (Gauker 1994, 277).
9 CC can thus take on board Zawidzki’s idea that attitude attributions play an important role
in impressionmanagement (Zawidzki 2013, 224). Unlike Zawidzki, though, I do not locate
the need to introduce the concepts of belief and desire in an explanatory context and I take
BD attributions to oen have damaging eects on the attributee.
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Gauker has also applied CC to explain the acquisition of the concepts of
belief and desire. In (Van Cleave and Gauker 2010) it is argued that explicit
false-belief tasks (passing of which has been oen taken as an indicator of a
child’s having the concept of belief) invite a child to consider what a person’s
contribution to the conversation would be. So for instance, if a child is asked
what a person thinks a Smarties box contains, she should respond that the
person in question thinks that the box contains Smarties (not pencils, which
the box actually contains), and by doing that she simply asserts on that per-
son’s behalf what her contribution to the conversation about the contents
of the box would be (Van Cleave and Gauker 2010, 316). CC also explains
developmental data quite well. For instance, children seem to master the
concept of desire earlier than the concept of belief (Wellman and Woolley
1990).e communication conception oers an explanation. According to
VanCleave andGauker, this is due to the fact that children are able to under-
stand and produce commands before theymaster the belief-talk (VanCleave
andGauker 2010, 318). Such a developmental asymmetry between two kinds
of speech act understanding has empirical support (Rakoczy and Tomasello
2009).
e communicative conception, then, seems to provide a suitable ex-
planation of why the concepts of belief and desire would be needed in our
everyday communicative practices, assuming that IT is on the right track.
However, CC faces one serious diculty. It seems to be committed to lin-
guistic determinism, i.e., the idea that BD attributions are constitutively de-
pendent on linguistic abilities. Gauker is quite explicit about the tight con-
nection between the two, claiming that thementalizing ability only develops
together with linguistic competence (Gauker 2011, 167). ere is evidence,
however, already pointed out in Section 2, which suggests that the ability to
ascribe attitudes can be present while a person has seriously impaired lan-
guage ability.10 is indicates that by assuming linguistic determinism as
CC does, IT is vulnerable to the existing evidence against determinism. We
should look whether the insights expressed by CC could be extended so that
it would avoid this vulnerability. In the next section, I am going to oer a
suggestion for how to do that.
5. Beliefs and desires in gestures
According to the communicative conception, by attributing beliefs and de-
sires to others we can treat them as our communication partners whowe can
10 To be fair to Gauker, he acknowledges the data in question but dismisses it too quickly by
speculating that perhaps agrammatic aphasics have retained the ability that they acquired
when they still had their linguistic abilities (Gauker 2011, 170). is speculation seems
quite ad hoc.
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evaluate through agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval, even
when explicit communication is absent. If we accept CC in its present form,
BD attributions are limited to contexts of linguistic communication. Not all
communication involves language, however. People also express themselves
emotionally, engage in joint attention and use pointing to get what they want
from each other. In what follows, I intend to argue that CC and IT do not
have to be committed to the idea that the understanding of attitudes requires
linguistic capacities.e relevant responses can also arise in non-linguistic
contexts and, as it turns out, we can nd these responses already at the level
of gestural communication.
A fundamental type of gesture which belongs to the basic level of human
intersubjectivity is pointing. By pointing to objects in the environment, peo-
ple can guide each others’ attention and establish social relations. It is also
one of the earliest forms of gesture that infants learn. Pointing to objects
and events may serve dierent purposes, however. It can be used to indi-
cate something in the environment out of curiosity or in order to indicate
a possible threat, but it can also be employed to order someone to bring
the object which is being pointed at. A distinction in that regard has been
drawn between declarative and imperative pointing. Imperative pointing is
presumably instrumental, in that the one who points uses another person
as a means to get the object that is pointed at, while declarative pointing
is used to share attention with another person (Tomasello 1999). Besides
declarative pointing, we can also talk about informative pointing, the aim of
which is not simply to share attention, but to share information (Liszkowski
et al. 2006), or interrogative pointing, the aim of which is to get information
about the object or event pointed at (Southgate et al. 2007).
For the present purposes, the general distinction between imperative
and declarative pointing suces, so that the latter also covers informative
and interrogative gestures, as long as this allows us to dierentiate between
two kinds of response prole with regard to two general types of pointing.
ese two kinds map onto the responses of approval/disapproval and agree-
ment/disagreement, respectively. If such responses were also appropriate
with respect to pointing gestures, there would be room to argue that BD
attributions could already be involved at the level of pointing.
In the case of imperative pointing, it is easy to see that something like ap-
proval or disapproval is the appropriate evaluative response to it: if a person,
A, points to an object, X, so that another person, B, would bring X to her,
then B can choose whether to follow the imperative or not, thus expressing
his approval or disapproval of A’s act. We can say that imperative pointing
has the same (or at least similar) communicative signicance as command-
ing: both call for a specic type of response which consists in the evaluation
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of whether what is gestured at and commanded should be received by A or
not. Imperative pointing is a primitive type of command.
When we turn to the acts of declarative pointing, it is not so clear that
agreement or disagreement are proper responses to them. By declaratively
pointing toX, a persondoes not seem tomake a claimaboutXwhich another
person can then agree or disagree with. To arrive at these responses we need
to introduce more communicative context. Declarative pointing can oen
bemotivated by a question. Imagine a situation where A seeks for X, while B
watches. If A declaratively points to a location, B can then agree or disagree
in response to that gesture as to whether X is actually in that location.ere
is also an additional way in which a declarative gesture can be assertion-
like: if A points toward a specic location and mimics the appearance of X,
he can convey a claim that X is in that location (see Sterenly 2012, 2145). B
who sees this act can then evaluate whether the conveyed claim is true or
not. ese examples should suce to show that declarative pointing can
motivate agreement or disagreement, just like assertions (or beliefs) do.
e responses of agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval,
then, are not only apparent in the context of linguistic communication, but
they come up in gestural communication as well.is fact lets us locate the
need for the concepts of belief and desire already at the level of pointing.
e concept of belief can already be introduced in order to enable one to
react to another person as if she had performed an act of declarative point-
ing. As we can treat someone as if she had asserted something, given her
behavioral dispositions, so we can treat her in certain contexts as if she had
declaratively pointed to something, and this can constitute a belief attribu-
tion.e concept of desire, on the other hand, can be used to treat another
person as if she had pointed imperatively, again given her behavior and re-
actions. BD attributions, then, can be taken to be a form of pointing on oth-
ers’ behalf, or simulated pointing.11 As in the case of assertions and com-
mands, the practice of attributing beliefs and desires extends the responses
of agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval to situations wherein
an agent has not explicitly pointed (or perhaps her authority is under doubt),
but when it is still proper to treat her as if she had. According to such amod-
ied version of CC, mental state attribution is not explained by speech act
understanding.ere is an explanatorily more basic level at which the char-
acteristic responses to attitudes are exhibited—the level of gestural commu-
nication.
is proposal coheres well with IT because it takes BD attributions to be
a relatively rare, but still an important part of human social cognition, which
11 It is important to stress that pointing on another’s behalf does not have to involve a physical
act of pointing. Instead, mental simulation suces.
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is employed in communicative contexts. It is not committed to the idea that
beliefs and desires are posits which are necessary for explaining and predict-
ing behavior or for engaging in everyday social interactions, and it does not
presuppose linguistic determinism of BD attributions either. Admittedly,
this is also a speculative proposal. Nevertheless, it coheres with the develop-
mental data, according to which the capacity to point declaratively emerges
later than imperative pointing (Camaioni et al. 2004). Since there is a sim-
ilar developmental asymmetry also between belief- and desire-attributions,
it is reasonable to speculate that the asymmetries between the development
of two types of attitude attribution and between declarative and imperative
pointing are intimately connected. Naturally, this connection needs to be
submitted to further empirical scrutiny.
In any case, IT which adopts such an extension of CC should accept
that the capacity for BD attribution is probably acquired earlier than the
results of the explicit-false belief tasks seem to suggest (this is something
that Gauker himself would deny).is also means that, pace Gallagher and
Hutto (2008), BD attributions should be located at the second level of inter-
subjectivity which develops ontogenetically before the mastery of linguistic
practices and involves understanding the pragmatic contexts of others’ ac-
tions (Gallagher andHutto 2008, 23).e fact that pointing on others’ behalf
already involves BD attributions gives a reason to think that the respective
capacity emerges quite early in development. A suitable type of experiment
by which to test this might already be available, namely, the active-helping
paradigm in which a child is invited to help another person to nd an ob-
ject by pointing to the right location. is requires understanding to what
location it is proper to point, given the seeking behavior of another person.
Evidence indicates that children pass this test already by the 18-month mark
(Buttelman et al. 2009).12 Some interactionists might balk at the suggestion
that such tasks demonstrate genuine understanding of belief but if we take IT
to be primarily a position about the extent to which people resort to mental-
izing, we should accept the mentalizing interpretation of the data from the
active helping paradigm. In Section 2, I already argued that IT, as I dene
it, need not assume that the development of BD attribution is constitutively
dependent on linguistic abilities.
One should also keep in mind that accepting the mentalizing interpre-
tation of the active helping paradigm does not commit us to understand
other implicit false belief tasks in terms of BD attributions. Given that the
present view locates BD attributions in a communicative context, observa-
tional paradigms for testing the capacity to attribute false beliefs, such as
violation of expectation and anticipatory looking, are given lower-level ex-
12 Admittedly, the study only investigated belief attribution.
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planations in terms of perceptual novelty, à la Heyes. We need not give the
same interpretation to dierent paradigms that have been intended to probe
mentalizing capacities in young infants. According to the present picture,
active helping requires an exercise of dierent capacities than the observa-
tional paradigms do. e latter do not reveal a primary way of responding
to one another.e need for BD attributions is still limited to specic com-
municative contexts (pace ToM).
6. Conclusion
In this paper I argued that if Interactioneory is to explain the role of belief
and desire attribution in human social life, it has to locate it in the context of
interpersonal communication, both verbal and nonverbal. A popular pro-
posal which takes them to be devices for normalizing explanation does not
account for the primary signicance of these attributions. If one believes that
Interactioneory is on the right track and attitude ascriptions are a rela-
tively peripheral part of social cognition, the Communicative Conception
is the most promising account of these attributions, as long as one keeps in
mind that beliefs and desires are not only attributed to assert or command,
but also to point on others’ behalf.
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